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Geology and World Politics: Mineral Resource 
Appraisals as Tools of Geopolitical  
Calculation, 1919-1939 
Andrea Westermann ∗ 
Abstract: »Geologie und Weltpolitik: Rohstoffschätzungen als Instrumente ge-
opolitischen Kalküls, 1919-1939«. How is nature transformed into natural re-
sources? Histories analyzing the state sciences of agriculture and forestry in the 
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries showed that these sciences rede-
fined nature as natural resources by making them amenable to cameralistic 
calculation, bookkeeping and accountability. Against this background, my first 
line of inquiry is exploring how, over the twentieth century, nonfuel mineral 
resource appraisals, i.e. attempts to quantify the metal content of the earth’s 
crust, became the first hold that societies took on earth matters, transforming 
them into mineral resources. My second objective is to describe and explain a 
widening of scope. Around 1900, geologists and other mineral resource experts 
began to appraise minerals on a global scale and survey trends in the world-
wide production and consumption of minerals. I argue that, after World War I, 
states started to use global mineral resource appraisals as tools of geopolitical 
calculation, aimed at measuring and managing both natural resources and 
state power relations. The global perspective was only one reason why mineral 
resources became amenable to economic and political management on a vast 
scale, though. In addition, global mineral resource supply and estimates had to 
be cast and discussed in an explicitly functionalist language in order to fit the 
interwar technocratic ideas of planning and maintaining world order. 
Keywords: History of the earth sciences, technocracy, international relations, 
globalization. 
1.  Introduction 
Minerals are only marketable after investments of large amounts of capital, 
energy and labor. To become commodities, they need what contemporaries 
soon characterized as an entire supply system on an international scale: states, 
private companies, and science collaborating to satisfy the world’s hunger for 
minerals, thereby forming new alliances, institutions and regulations. Experts 
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have claimed that the turn of the twentieth century marked a new era for the 
output of the system. In 1931, University of Wisconsin Professor Charles Ken-
neth Leith outlined the historical change taking place by listing some of the 
records that had just been broken: “Few realize […] the fact, for instance, that 
in a hundred years, the output of pig iron, copper and mineral fuels has in-
creased a hundredfold; that more mineral resources have been mined and con-
sumed since the opening of the century than in all preceding history” (Leith 
1970 [1931], 34). This trend continued. Both the growth rates and the output 
figures of major metals rose exponentially in the second half of the twentieth 
century (Wellmer, Dalheimer and Wagner 2007, 188). By the end of that centu-
ry, the amount of metal ores and other industrial minerals extracted each year 
had increased by a factor of 27 compared to 1900 (Krausmann et al. 2009, 
2699). How did the systematic and international supply of mineral resources 
develop over the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries, creating an ever-
increasing stream of metal raw materials? 
We know a lot about the history of specific mining regions, mining educa-
tion and technologies (Ochs 1992; Hovis and Mouat 1996; Burt 2000; Brianta 
2000; Lingenfelter 2003; Isenberg 2005; Laboulais 2008). Historians have 
given us accounts of particular mineral raw materials and analyses of the indus-
tries or specific mining firms (Prain 1975; Harvey 1981; Yergin 1991; Nest 
2011). Fuel and nonfuel minerals have been addressed as pertaining to the 
infrastructure of global commodity chains (Innis 1933, 18; Topik and Wells 
2012, 625). Several analyses of US mineral resource policies also exist (Eckes 
1979; Priest 2003). But how is nature transformed into mineral resources in the 
first place? While this question focuses on foundational concepts and practices 
for the overall system of supply and its capacity to grow, research on the histo-
ry of science or environmental history has only started to address the problem. 
Günter Bayerl (1994), Henry E. Lowood (1990) and James C. Scott (1998) 
showed that the state sciences of agriculture and forestry in the eighteenth and 
early nineteenth centuries aimed at redefining nature as natural resources by 
making nature amenable to cameralistic calculation, bookkeeping and account-
ability (Porter 1994). Drawing on their work, I explore, in a first line of inquiry, 
how, over the twentieth century, nonfuel mineral resource appraisals, i.e. esti-
mations of the metal content of the earth’s crust, became the first hold that 
societies took on earth matters, transforming them into mineral resources (Hal-
ler, Höhler and Westermann 2014; for the history of oil estimates, see Bowden 
1985; Gautier 2000; Graf 2014; Priest 2014). 
My second objective is to describe and explain a new function that mineral 
resource appraisals acquired for politics in the early twentieth century. Around 
1900, geologists and other mineral resource experts began to appraise minerals 
on a global scale and survey trends in international mineral production and 
consumption more frequently. After World War I, a small wave of books and 
essays appeared including International Control of Minerals (Mining and Met-
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allurgical Society of America 1925); Mineral Resources and their Effect on 
International Relations (Bain 1930); World Minerals and World Politics. A 
Factual Study of Minerals in Their Political and International Relations (Leith 
1970 [1931]); The Mineral Sanction as an Aid to International Security (Hol-
land 1935); and Die mineralischen Bodenschätze als weltpolitische und mili-
tärische Machtfaktoren (Friedensburg 1936). 
These endeavors gained unprecedented support: Global mineral resource 
appraisals attracted the attention of politics like never before. Industrial states 
started to compare their inventories of nature with those of other countries as a 
means to measure state power and determine and manage power relations. 
“World politics,” as the emerging field of international relations was known in 
the interwar years, took up the reasoning, numbers and world depictions pro-
vided by mineral resource estimates. I argue that mineral resources appraisals, 
besides being cameralistic tools to account for and manage one’s own nature 
capital, also became instruments of geopolitical calculation. Global mineral 
resource knowledge inextricably linked knowledge about the earth with 
knowledge about the world and hence was suited to become “global power 
knowledge” (Krige and Barth 2006). 
But the globalization of mineral resource appraisals was only one reason 
why mineral resources became amenable to economic and political manage-
ment on a vast scale, beyond the nation state (section 3). In addition, global 
mineral resource supply and estimates had to be cast and discussed in an ex-
plicitly functionalist language (sections 4 and 5) in order to fit interwar techno-
cratic ideas of planning and maintaining world order (section 6). Before unfold-
ing the argument, let me explain more about the nature of mineral resource 
appraisals (section 2). 
2.  Mineral Resource Appraisals: Combining Natural and 
Social Scientific Knowledge 
There are three aspects of mineral resource appraisals. First, geologists have to 
find mineral ore deposits through geological, geophysical and geochemical 
exploration, then determine their size and ore grade, i.e. the actual metal con-
tent. It is not enough, however, to simply localize mineral occurrences of a 
certain element and determine their geological extension. One has to know 
whether, how, and at what cost these occurrences could be made available for 
human use. A second problem therefore is to take into account the development 
of mining technology, mine organization, production and transportation costs. 
Mining capacities, mine organization and production costs mostly depend on 
how deep beneath the surface the ore deposits are located. Low and high-grade 
ores need different, cost-determining refinement techniques. Last but not least, 
one needs to forecast world mineral consumption. Mineral resource appraisals 
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have to take into account the future demand for international metal raw materi-
als and world market prices. After all, only those minerals recoverable at a 
profit now or in the near future are counted as ‘reserves.’1 As to mineral re-
source appraisals, a division of labor was soon established: known global min-
eral reserves to be profitably mined are currently appraised by the mineral 
mining and trading industry, whereas the estimation of submarginal mineral 
reserves and unknown mineral resources in weakly explored territories are, as a 
rule, inferred by state geologists and academic research (Wellmer and Becker-
Platen 1999, 117). 
Consequently, geological, technical and economic factors need to be com-
bined in order to appraise both the size and ‘lifetime’ of the mineral resources 
available to a single mine, a larger mining district or state territories. Mineral 
resource estimations include forecasts about societies’ future development (for 
the impact of social scientific knowledge on the earth sciences, see also 
Oreskes, this issue). Thus geologists pointed out early on that ‘ore,’ ‘ore depos-
it’ and ‘ore reserves’ were dynamic, constructivist notions. Mineral resource 
appraisals were provisionary in that they were time-bound and tied to a con-
crete social context. They provided only a momentary overview or a snapshot 
in time and had to be recurrently updated. Furthermore, mineral resource ap-
praisals were dynamic in that they not only aimed to survey all ore deposits or 
ore-containing rocks, but did so according to economic criteria. Rudolf Nasse, 
head official of the Prussian state mines bureau, explained in 1893, that in a min-
eral appraisal, only those ore deposits were included “whose extraction seemed 
technically feasible and economically profitable” (Nasse 1893, 6; also Beck 
1901; Launay 1912). Ore deposits, defined as “subterranean treasures,” were thus 
given the economic meaning of ‘stock’ or ‘inventory’ (‘Erzlager’ or ‘Erzlager-
stätten’), implied by the notion treasure as “an inventory of precious things” 
(Zedler 1737, vol. 16, col. 232 on ‘Lager, Vorrath and Waaren’; Krünitz 1825, 
vol. 140, 453 on ‘Schatz’). 
The encyclopedia entries indicate that the economic framing of ‘ore’ and 
‘ore deposit’ had its roots in the cameralistic or state sciences in the German-
speaking countries of the eighteenth century. These sciences embraced the idea 
of economically organized nature lending itself readily to the service of society 
(Lindenfeld 1997, 28-9). Hans Carl von Carlowitz (1713), in his Sylvicultura 
Oeconomica, and Carl von Linné (1749) in his Oeconomia Naturae, for in-
stance, argued that nature’s economy, i.e. nature’s perfect organization accord-
ing to the principles of rationality and utility, testified to the existence of a 
divine creator and administrator – a conviction known as physicotheology (see 
Worster 1977, 31-2; Trepp 2009, 306-72). While the renewable resources of 
                                                             
1 For the emerging distinction between ‘reserves’ and ‘resources’ according to criteria of 
profitability and certainty of knowledge on the existence and size of resources, see Blondel 
and Lasky (1956); McKelvey (1972); Pratt and Brobst (1974, 2). 
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agriculture and forestry were subject to the “quantifying spirit” from the mid-
eighteenth century onwards (Frängsmyr, Heilbron and Rider 1990; Lindenfeld 
1997, 30), geological mapping and mineral appraisal followed suit. In 1791, 
Saxony led the way when Abraham Gottlob Werner was commissioned to 
make the first comprehensive mineral survey. A better understanding of na-
ture’s mineral economy sought to increase the output of royal mines and the 
gains from mining concessions, two important sources of state revenue. Twenty 
years later, in 1811, Werner submitted his Relation über die aus sämtlichen 
bisherigen geognostischen Untersuchungen im sächsischen Lande sich erge-
benden Ergebnisse in Hinsicht auf das Vorkommen nützlicher, besonders 
brennbarer Fossilien und deren zweckmäßigste Nutzung (Werner 1811). The 
title “Report on the Results Drawn from all Known Geognostic Surveys of the 
Saxon Territory Regarding the Deposits of the Usable, in Particular, Combus-
tible Fossils and their most Utilitarian Use” suggests that the Freiberg professor 
of mineralogy embraced the idea of nature being cast in economic terms, an 
“oeconomia mineralium” (Reuß 1777, 11). According to the German romantic 
writer Novalis and his modern interpreters, Werner shared the physicotheologi-
cal views of his time. Novalis, who was also a civil servant trained by Werner 
for the state-run mining industry, modeled the teachers and miners of his nov-
els after Werner, having them adhere to a paradigm of nature’s utility (Hering-
man 2004, 177-8). 
3.  Globalizing Mineral Resource Appraisals 
Mineral resource appraisals were first undertaken at the level of individual 
mines or mining districts (Westermann 2014, 23-4) and became global in the 
first three decades of the twentieth century. In appraising ore deposits, director 
of the US Geological Survey George Otis Smith claimed, geologists had to 
systematically check the “competitive relationships” these might have with far-
flung mining sites: “The geologic relations of a Nevada ore deposit, for in-
stance, must be observed with an eye trained to see far beyond the Basin range; 
the geologist needs to compare the quality and quantity of the unmined ore here 
with similar facts of nature that give value to the ores in other districts as in 
Peru or Burma” (Smith 1921, 3a). Introducing the World Atlas of Commercial 
Geology of 1921, Smith once more underscored that geological and world 
economic considerations were inextricably linked in mineral resource apprais-
al. Any “inventory of the mineral wealth of the United States” had to be further 
complemented “with a broad understanding of world demand and supply” of 
mineral raw materials (United States Geological Survey 1921, 3). 
A world perspective on mineral resources had, of course, been present be-
fore: Far-flung, huge territories like China or Latin America had long spurred 
Europeans’ imagination of mineral wealth. Early twentieth-century accounts of 
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the mineral resources of China, though unsatisfactory due to a lack of empirical 
evidence, “asserted with confidence” that the country was “immensely rich in 
mineral deposits,” just as Marco Polo had reported in the thirteenth century and 
Ferdinand Richthofen’s travel accounts had substantiated in the 1870s (Roor-
bach 1912, 130-53; Osterhammel 1987). This vision had long proved true for 
the territories discovered by Portuguese and Spanish long-distance maritime 
travelers seeking alternative trade routes to East Asia: Great amounts of gold 
and silver had been shipped from Latin America to Europe since the sixteenth 
century (Kamen 2002, 285-330). The desire to access Latin America’s mineral 
endowment guided American dollar diplomacy in the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries (Friedensburg 1936, 138; Brown 1993; Rosenberg 1999; Priest 2003). 
Such ideas about “marvelous possessions” (Greenblatt 1991) and direct for-
eign investments in their exploration notwithstanding, governments or industry 
initiated scientifically more robust and detailed inventories of single mineral 
commodities such as iron ore or coal on a more comprehensive level, that is for 
geographically more extended domestic territories, only after 1880. The emerg-
ing global perspective assessing mineral reserves beyond national territories 
was fuelled by both scientific and political factors. Most importantly, perhaps, 
it fitted the ongoing trend within the earth sciences to obtain global knowledge 
of the earth. At the turn of the twentieth century, earth sciences produced new 
technical images of the whole earth. Earthquake research, tectonics and mete-
orology mapped new global entities such as earthquake belts, shifting conti-
nents, or global volcano smoke streams, thus helping modern societies to sus-
tain cultural and political ideas of globality (Dörries 2005; Westermann 2011). 
Resource geologists added another global structure to this collection of whole-
earth pictures. In the 1920s, Charles K. Leith identified a “power belt” of coex-
isting coal and iron ore deposits stretching over the northern hemisphere “from 
the Mississippi Valley through Russia” (Leith 1927, 133). This Atlantic power 
belt was not so much a large-scale earth structure, though. In the vein of miner-
al economics sketched above, it was a geoeconomic phenomenon blending 
earthly and worldly matters. It was, as Leith put it in an earlier publication,  
an expression rather of the localized application of energy to mineral re-
sources by the people of this part of the world. […] The controlling factor is 
not the amount of minerals present in the ground; this is known to be large in 
other parts of the world and more will be found when necessary. Controlling 
factors must be looked for in historical, ethnological and environmental condi-
tions (Leith 1921, 63). 
The first survey coordinated with the international scientific community was 
presented at the 11th International Geological Congress held in Stockholm in 
1910, and dealt with iron ore. The Swedish mining industry, which sponsored 
the meeting, had proposed compiling this report. Its editors found the title of 
the volumes “The Iron Ore Resources of the World” rather euphemistic; in the 
introduction, they suggested a far more appropriate title “the actual knowledge 
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of iron ore resources” in line with two facts (The General Secretary of the 
Congress 1910, xiii). The survey actually covered a very small part of the 
earth’s continental crust: Only 13.3 percent of the global landmasses had been 
explored and inventoried in detail (Friedensburg 1913, 77). Consequently, it 
was considered a general, albeit unsurprising, insight gained from the joint 
efforts of the earth scientists that a region’s iron ore resources tended to in-
crease with the advancement of detailed exploration work (Sjögren 1910, xx). 
Estimations of ultimately recoverable global mineral resources had to re-
main “speculative” (Sjögren 1912, 300) and yet were attempted regularly. In 
order to know “how much probability is there that new, hitherto unknown iron 
ores resources will be discovered in the less thoroughly investigated countries,” 
Swedish geologist Hjalmar Sjögren suggested using “an iron coefficient”: “the 
quantity of iron, within a certain area expressed in tons, divided by the area 
expressed in square kilometers.” The world iron ore survey had shown that the 
best investigated parts of the world, consisting of Europe, the US and Japan, 
with a total 17,368,117 square kilometers, contained roughly 7 billion tons of 
actual and 49 billion tons of potential reserves. “If we start from the primary 
supposition that the iron coefficient of the hitherto uninvestigated parts of the 
world’s surface is the same as the coefficient of those best investigated,” Sjögren 
explained, “we arrive at a probable figure of the iron ore resources of the entire 
world” (Sjögren 1912, 300). The international geological congress made other 
world inventories for coal (1913), phosphate (1926) and copper (1935). 
Large-scale inventory efforts served national political interests, too. The 
tenth US census of 1880, published in 1886, which included a Report on the 
Mining Industries of the United States (exclusive of the precious metals) with 
Special Investigations into the Iron Resources of the Republic and into the 
Cretaceous Coals of the Northwest, is one of the milestones in this respect. The 
report was assigned to the US Geological Survey founded only a year earlier in 
1879. Elaborate questionnaires and classifications were created for the census 
report. The report aimed to catalog and appraise the mineral resources with 
which “the material prosperity of the United States of the 20th century must be 
built” (Pumpelly 1885, 3). The census report laid the foundations for an annual-
ly updated collection of data published by the US Geological Survey, the US 
metal statistics. Arguably, these statistics were the most important result of the 
1880 effort. Together with the “metal statistics” of the German multinational 
Metallgesellschaft AG, the US Geological Survey commodity reports and year-
books of minerals evolved into a widely cited tool for the international mineral 
resource sector, a ‘backbone institution’ in the world of metal raw materials.2 
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At the turn of the century, the need for global self-positioning of states in 
regard to mineral wealth was being articulated with increasing frequency. Ru-
dolf Nasse’s Die Kohlenvorräthe der europäischen Staaten, insbesondere 
Deutschlands, und deren Erschöpfung [The coal reserves of the European 
States, Germany in particular, and their exhaustion] of 1893 provided an early 
version of what became the typical line of reasoning. It is interesting to recall 
the survey’s original task: In the summer of 1890 the Prussian Minister of 
Commerce, Baron von Berlepsch, asked the state mines bureau – Nasse was 
one of the head officials – to ascertain the size of the coal reserves stored in the 
state’s various deposits of bituminous coal, as proven by actually mined expo-
sures and estimated by inferring from general geognostic knowledge of the 
territory (Nasse 1893, 10). Nasse explained why he had broadened the assign-
ment considerably and included in his report studies on the coal reserves not 
only of Prussia but also of the German Reich and Europe, and why he had even 
given numbers for the entire world: “Only by comparing the reserves, does the 
single result become meaningful” (Nasse 1893, 11). 
Based on global inventories of mineral resources and a wealth of new statis-
tical data, the global positioning of states and global self-positioning slowly 
became routine endeavors: How large were one’s own domestic stocks of natu-
ral resources compared to global stocks and global production? In posing this 
question, the emerging field of mineral economics combined a national and a 
world economic perspective. In this, it differed from the earlier cameralistic 
calculations regarding mineral resources. Moreover, research was directed to-
wards determining “worldwide deposits of a certain mineral or at least those ore 
deposits located within the world-trading countries” (Krahmann 1903, 1, 3).  
Consequently, interwar reports were synoptically organized according to a 
range of different mineral commodities and the “mineral position” of nation-
states. They addressed the questions of what was the amount of most important 
minerals globally, and how this mineral wealth was distributed nationally. In the 
same vein, geologists determined a nation’s “mineral factor in the world posi-
tion,” its “Rangordnung” or “present mineral position” (Smith 1919; Friedens-
burg 1936, 50; Leith 1943, 32; Pehrson 1946). There were rankings like these:  
In 1913, the United States ranked first in the production of 13 out of the 30 
most important mineral commodities and ranked second in four others. […] 
Russia, Austria and Spain each ranked first in the production of two of the 30 
commodities and second in one (United States Geological Survey 1921, 4).  
In their composition, the new reports contrasted both with academic textbooks 
where ore deposits were classified according to major mineral occurrences of 
the same genetic origin, and also with the first global inventories of single 
minerals. Yet another feature emerged: Mineral availability was no longer only 
                                                                                                                                
sche Zusammenstellungen über Blei, Kupfer, Zink und Zinn von der Metallgesellschaft 
Frankfurt am Main in den Jahren 1890-1892. 
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defined in terms of “economic viability,” as had been the case in classic mining 
geology. It became equally important to know whether mineral resources were 
politically available or accessible: Geological surveys or mining institutions 
investigated which states possessed the “commercial control” of perhaps re-
mote mineral sources and were therefore in a position to disrupt or divert the 
global mineral flows to their own strategic advantage (Spurr 1920; Rawles 
1933). 
4.  Casting Mineral Resource Appraisal and Supply in 
Functionalist Language and Images 
In the aftermath of the raw material shortages of World War I, geologists start-
ed to cast mineral resource estimates and supply in a functionalist language – 
thus making explicit the place of industry, economy, consumption and interna-
tional politics within the mineral resource business. In its most general form, 
the issue was approached by accounts of how the industrialized world had 
come about and explanations of the crucial roles played in its creation by coal 
and iron. An introductory lecture in mineral economics in 1932, for instance, 
underlined that minerals were of critical importance to industry, supplying 
“both the power and the machine” (Tryon and Berquist 1932, 5). German geol-
ogist and mining engineer Ferdinand Friedensburg added that world transport 
equally depended on the availability of coal and iron ore (Friedensburg 1934, 
9). US geologist and technocrat activist Marion King Hubbert arguably provid-
ed the most radical functionalist or cybernetic description of mineral resources: 
“Modern industry may be conceived of as one vast flow-line of minerals flow-
ing from the earth by way of the mines into industry, and finally, by wastage 
and chemical disintegration, returning to earth again” (Hubbert 1934, 19). 
The idea of “world transport” was a functionalist concept in itself, where 
large technical networks of connection and synchronization had furthered the 
vertical and horizontal consolidation of big industries such as the metal indus-
try (Geistbeck 1895, 526-30) and allowed for the worldwide control of supply 
chains, i.e. the “absorption, storage and distribution of commodity flows” (Ra-
thenau 1925 [1916], 49). The world map “Le Simplon et la route des Indes,” 
for instance, with its special outline made by the Lausanne engineer Eduard 
Pellis in 1876, illustrates the idea of an engineered global transportation net-
work of the shortest lines (Fig. 1). On Pellis’s map, the long-discussed Simplon 
Tunnel is depicted as a direct prolongation of the “almost linear Red Sea and 
the newly opened Suez Canal both pointing straight to Europe” (Pellis 1876, 1). 
On this map, the Simplon Tunnel appears as the second-last section to be real-
ized on the direct route from India to London. The last stretch would be the 
Channel Tunnel. 
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Figure 1:  The Simplon and the Route to India  
 
Source: Pellis (1876). 
 
Not only mineral resource supply but also mineral resource appraisals were 
conceived in functionalist terms, as Friedensburg’s outline shows where the 
size of mineral reserves was a “product” or function of “variable factors”: “All 
metals are dispersed more or less thinly over the entire earth’s crust; exactly 
when an aggregation becomes a deposit to be mined at a profit (“bauwürdig”) 
and hence enters the cycle of the supply reserves for the earth, is not so much 
dependent on the grade of concentration but rather of the circumstances deter-
mining the costs of potential utilization. The quantity of usable reserves of a 
certain raw material is quite a relative notion, a product of several variable 
factors of which the actual costs and the price of the product are the most im-
portant” (Friedensburg 1936, 73-4). 
German-born economist Erich Walter Zimmermann, who had started out re-
searching world transportation issues such as British coal exports and interna-
tional trade and shipping (Zimmermann 1911, 1917), ended up suggesting a 
functional approach to natural resources and their appraisal. In 1933, he pub-
lished World Resources and Industries: A Functional Appraisal of the Availa-
bility of Agricultural and Industrial Resources. From a social science perspec-
tive, Zimmermann offered a comprehensive assessment of the human, cultural 
and natural factors determining resource availability. He defined resources as a 
function of human wants and abilities: only aspects of “the environment in the 
service of man” could be regarded as natural resources. “A man-less universe” 
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would be void of resources, he argued (Zimmermann 1933, 3). In 1942, he was 
given one of the first professorships of natural resource economics at the Uni-
versity of Texas. 
5.  New Methods of Mineral Resource Appraisal 
Functionalist portrayals of global mineral resource appraisals explained and 
reflected on the complexities of determining mineral reserves for large-scale 
portions of the earth in an exercise of popular enlightenment. In doing so, geol-
ogists spread as news what was by then well known among experts. At the 
same time, functionalist thinking also guided their research into new methods 
of mineral resource estimation. These attempts to appraise mineral resources by 
linking geological and social scientific data contributed to the gradual develop-
ment of mineral or natural resource economics as an academic discipline which, 
in the second half of the twentieth century, became indispensable for the man-
agement of natural resources (Westermann 2014). 
Donnel Foster Hewett of the US Geological Survey, for instance, proposed 
an appraisal method which would serve after 1945 as a model for Hubbert’s 
estimates of petroleum production in his “peak oil” model (Hewett 1929; Hub-
bert 1975, 9-11). During a trip to Europe in 1926, Hewett visited twenty-eight 
mining districts and about fifty mines, many of which were or had been outstand-
ing sources of different metals in the past. In his search for the “record or evi-
dence of the stages of life in the metal industries,” he also turned to the many 
studies which European, in particular German and Austrian historians, econo-
mists and engineers had dedicated to the history of metal production. Hewett felt 
that Americans could benefit from reviewing the experiences in mineral exploita-
tion acquired by the Europeans with “a record of metal production extending 
back nearly 3000 years” (Hewett 1929, 3). The report was reprinted in Tryon 
and Berquist’s (1932) collection of articles on “mineral economics,” thus en-
joying a larger circulation than the original technical publication of the Ameri-
can Institute of Mining and Metallurgical Engineers (AIME). 
Hewett aimed to systematically relate existing data on mineral industrial ac-
tivities and the magnitude of unknown ultimately recoverable ore resources of 
a country. His approach of determining metal production trends took the pro-
duction numbers of individual mining districts as the base unit for national 
statistics. The cyclical patterns Hewett found in reviewing the history of the 
single mining districts showed slow initial production preceding rapid growth 
as readily available resources were mined, followed by peak production and 
slow decline as the remaining resources became more difficult to harvest. In 
other words, different stages of a production cycle could be distinguished by 
observing which of the successive economic activities listed below peaked in 
any given area: 
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1) exports of crude ore; 
2) number of mines in operation; 
3) number of smelters in operation; 
4) the production of metals from domestic ore; 
5) the quantity of import of crude ore (see Fig. 2). 
By identifying its current peak activity, Hewitt maintained, a region or country 
could determine how far it had progressed through the stages of rise or decline 
of metal production and assess the amount of recoverable mineral resources left 
for use in its territory (Hewett 1929, 26). 
Figure 2:  “No significance is to be attached to the relative heights attained by  
  these curves; I wish only to emphasize the successive relation of the  
  peaks.” Donnel Foster Hewett's Stages of the Metal Industries for  
  Countries with Fuels  
 
Source: Hewett (1929, 27). 
 
Hewett firmly embraced the idea that forecasting the future demanded a thor-
oughly historical perspective. The idea was gaining ground in the social scienc-
es, too. The “cycles in metal production” resonated with the “business cycles” 
explored at the same time by the National Bureau of Economic Research, es-
tablished in 1920 in New York, or the Institut für Konjunkturforschung in 
Berlin, established in 1925 (Fabricant 1984, 7). Many research institutions 
dedicated to the explanation and theoretical foundation of observed “cycles” or 
regular fluctuations as the normal course of capitalistic economy had been 
founded after the war. Wartime state economic planning had been in dire need 
of macroeconomic data and time series. In view of future state action, research 
on business cycles was to uncover past economic patterns and trends (Tooze 
2001, 103-48). 
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6.  Technocracy in Action 
The war created a new sensitivity for the issue of natural resources among the 
Entente and Allied powers: Former sources of supply had been cut off by the 
war’s interference with commerce while military industrial expansion had 
caused increased consumption of raw materials. As a result, German, French 
and US geologists and metal raw materials experts started to deal extensively 
with the geopolitical dimensions of mineral resources (De Launay 1918; Mer-
ton 1931; Friedensburg 1934). Longstanding political conflicts like the Alsace-
Lorraine question were now referred to as struggles over mineral resources, in 
this case over the greatest iron ore deposits of Europe. “How many realize that 
the Alsace-Lorraine question is and was not a sentimental one, but a struggle 
for the greatest iron deposits of Europe and the second largest in the world? 
That the dispute between Poland and Germany as to Upper Silesia is not a 
question of nationality, sentiment or even territory, but concerns the greatest 
coal field of Europe as well as great deposits of lead and zinc?” (Spurr 1920, 
vi, 38-41) Some geologists had been appointed political advisors to their gov-
ernments. Charles Kenneth Leith, for instance, had been a member of the US 
Shipping Board and War Industries Board and accompanied the US delegation 
under Bernard Baruch to Paris in order to negotiate peace in Versailles (Priest 
2000). Also, earlier conservationist ideas about “minimum waste of non-
replaceable materials” were addressed with new urgency (Hubbert 1943, 13 (24 
in the pdf file)). 
The interwar period saw the heyday of technocracy. Geologist Hubbert locat-
ed the origins of the technocratic movement in the US in the experience of war 
economic planning: “The way this organization came into being was through the 
association of a number of people here in Washington during the last war. That 
association arose from experience in the war agencies, the War Industry Board, I 
believe it was called then, and various other Government agencies” (Hubbert 
1943, 5 (15 in the pdf file)); on the US Shipping Board see Spurr 1919).3 Only 
because people, as we have seen, conceived national and international econo-
mies as functional systems could they claim to be in the position of engineering 
or regulating them (Veblen 1965 [1921], 52-6). Technocracy was defined by 
one of its US observers as “a method of scientific procedure in operating a 
mechanism of a continental order of magnitude” (Parrish 1933, 32). World 
                                                             
3 During World War II, Marion King Hubbert worked for the Division of Supply and Resources 
at the Board of Economic Warfare. In April 1943, the Board subjected him to questioning 
because the US Civil Service Commission had considered him unsuitable for the job due to 
his membership at Technocracy Inc., at the time considered “fascist in its setup and objec-
tives” and envisaging “a form of government not democratic in character” (United States 
Civil Service Commission 1943, 7; see also the interview with Hubbert in Doel 1989, session 
IV). 
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planning had definitely become an option. “Knowledge of what the whole 
world contains,” the World Atlas of Commercial Geology argued, “is plainly 
the best basis for discussing public policy and planning private business” 
(United States Geological Survey 1921, 4; see also Veblen’s 1965 [1921], 143 
call for “Resource Engineers”). 
From a conservationist and functional perspective, economists started, for 
instance, to deal with the question of how to use up non-renewable resources 
most efficiently (Hotelling 1931). Metal scrap recycling, systematically en-
forced during World War I, was an alternative way of enhancing the efficiency 
of metal raw materials consumption. Metallgesellschaft AG organized the 
“Kriegsmetallgesellschaft,” one of the several war economic planning boards 
managing the German “raw material economy” during World War I (Rathenau 
1925 [1916], 25). Since, by and large, Metallgesellschaft AG had controlled the 
German commercial and industrial network of nonferrous metals before 1914, 
a smooth operation was secured.4 Nonferrous metals like copper, zinc, lead and 
nickel were needed for self-contained metallic cartridges in Europe. In view of 
trade embargoes, the network began dealing in scrap metal. The recycling of 
scrap copper made Germany the second largest producer in the world (500,000 
tons), after the US – albeit that Anaconda’s Montana mines alone produced 
more copper than all Europe during the war, as William Yandell Elliott of 
Harvard’s Bureau of International Research, who had also been Vice President 
of the War Production Board in Charge of Civilian Requirements, was eager to 
emphasize (Elliott 1937, 407). 
Geologists acknowledged that with these and other calculations accounting 
for shortages and autarky in mineral resource supply, the “organically grown 
exchange” in mineral affairs (Friedensburg 1936, 130), the “natural course of 
commercial evolution“ (Smith 1921, 3a), the “natural channels of the interna-
tional flow of minerals” (Leith et al. 1933, 6), and “the more or less spontane-
ous internationalization of mineral resources by private enterprise” (Leith 1921, 
8a), could be deflected in the short run. To them, autarky was not a long-term 
option, however, given that world mineral resources were unevenly distributed 
geographically and no single state was endowed with everything it needed for 
economic and technological advancement – not even the resource-rich United 
States (Smith 1921; Friedensburg 1936, 69-70; Krahmann 1928, 20, 135). That 
even during periods of economic nationalism, such as the 1930s, a full third of 
the minerals were traded worldwide only substantiated this conviction 
                                                             
4 In 1914, Metallgesellschaft was the one major European member of the world copper 
oligopoly. Moreover, the company had made itself the central selling agency of the interna-
tional lead and zinc syndicates (Chandler 1990, 488). Also, for about a decade and a half, 
until 1914, it held the trading monopoly of Australian lead and zinc ores for continental 
Europe, by reaching an agreement between the three German nonferrous metal and mineral 
ore traders for the joint purchase of Australian zinc ores. 
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(Friedensberg 1936, 130). Moreover, the global outlook would become ever 
more important, since the proportion of global production in major consumer 
countries, including the United States and Germany, would decline over the 
twentieth century. 
The experts tended to lobby for long-term engineering or regulation of the 
global mineral material flow and propelled a mineral resource management 
where industrial organizational expertise and scientific knowledge coalesced to 
support the making of national and international raw material politics. A secure 
system of mineral resource supply would remain a staple for any “far-sighted 
handling of international relations,” they argued (Leith 1921 [1918], 16a; 
Friedensburg 1936, 9, 97). In 1927, Berlin geologist Max Krahmann extended 
an “invitation to co-operate” to his colleagues, pleading for an international 
association connecting international efforts of mining economics and aiming at 
the establishment of a future “International Institute of Mining Economics” 
(Krahmann 1928, 12 for the English version). Krahmann had presented his 
views on the methods and aims of geoeconomic inventories to the International 
Geological Congress in Madrid in 1926. The same year, he submitted a pro-
posal to the League of Nations regarding the creation of an “International Min-
ing Institute” modeled on the International Institute of Agriculture of 1905, the 
UN Food and Agriculture Organization’s (FAO) predecessor (Krahmann 1928, 
135-6). He underscored that mineral statistics suffered from incoherent and 
deficient data collection: “Under the methods at present employed in the differ-
ent countries in estimating the geological reserves or so-called inventories of 
mineral deposits, the technical possibilities of extraction and commercial ex-
ploitability which vary greatly from time to time and from place to place, com-
parison is not possible and these deposits cannot therefore be included in a 
common total without leading to erroneous conceptions.” Further defects need-
ed to be remedied, such as the neglect of the question of consumption, i.e. the 
lack of research into requirements according to raw material properties and raw 
material market and price development. In short: the International Mining 
Institute should act as a clearinghouse for international political, economic and 
scientific cooperation in the field of mineral resources. Its chief concern would 
be to “examine the question of establishing inventories of the world’s deposits” 
(Krahmann 1928, 15). Krahmann presented his suggestions as “a program to 
rationalize world economy” by advocating a technocratic approach to the raw 
materials sector: to him, the acknowledgement that “mineral economics was 
gradually becoming world politics” was a vital prerequisite for devising meth-
ods of political and economic intervention (Krahmann 1928, 21). 
Against the background of demographic growth, similar visions were elabo-
rated in the field of world population management. Accelerated rates of popula-
tion growth were the traditional flipside of natural resource availability. At the 
World Population Conference in Geneva of 1927, for instance, the director of 
the International Labor Office, Albert Thomas, dreamt of a world “populated in 
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accordance with […] local fertility and productive capacity.” He suggested 
creating a “supreme super-national authority which would regulate the distribu-
tion of population on rational and impartial lines, by controlling and directing 
migration movements and deciding on the opening-up or closing of countries to 
particular streams of immigration” (Thomas 1927, 262). 
Geologists found people and institutions ready to listen to their suggestions 
regarding global mineral resources. State agencies planned to build strategic 
mineral stocks in order to prevent wartime shortages in the future; they encour-
aged private mining companies to invest in mineral exploration and mining 
abroad and to reach international commodity agreements. International agen-
cies such as the League of Nations and private organizations such as the US 
Brookings Institute, the Geneva Research Centre, or the Berlin Institut für 
Konjunkturforschung extensively studied world mineral supply and demand 
with a view to identifying and managing economic and political resource con-
flicts among nation-states and world regions. As one of the many reports on 
international raw material policy put it: “The problem of raw materials actually 
became the test case in terms of which the representatives of the various coun-
tries tried to define the field of the League’s activity” (Kapp 1941, 23). A social 
scientific approach to international relations not only facilitated quantification 
efforts but also led to qualitative research in the field of mineral raw materials 
production and trade (Guilhot 2011, 129). Economist Albert O. Hirschman, for 
instance, began investigating the power hierarchies created and sustained by 
international trade. His book National Power and the Structure of Foreign 
Trade (Hirschman 1945), written during World War II, combined quantitative 
and qualitative approaches. In it, Hirschman remained skeptical as to the mutu-
al benefit of international raw material trade and helped lay the foundation for a 
critical discourse on mining and mineral raw material trade within the United 
Nations. These collective actors and their interests became permanent stake-
holders in the international mineral supply system. The first scientific confer-
ence of the United Nations, which took place in 1949, was dedicated to the 
Conservation and Utilization of Resources (United Nations 1950). Krahmann’s 
vision of an international mining institute under the umbrella of the League of 
Nations eventually materialized in 1994 as the UN International Seabed Au-
thority took up its work – dealing, however, exclusively with the metal ore 
deposits of the deep sea. 
7.  Conclusion 
In the interwar years, geologists, often in collaboration with economists, of-
fered mineral resource appraisals as tools for analyzing or organizing interna-
tional relations. They lobbied to make mineral resource knowledge a staple of 
both national economics and international political economy. 
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Two trends combined to make mineral resources amenable to international 
political management. First, a global perspective was added to the national 
economic focus of mineral resource estimates passed down from the cameral-
istic origins of mining and geology. Second, both international mineral re-
source supply and mineral resource estimates were addressed in a functionalist 
language in order to fit the interwar technocratic ideas of planning and main-
taining world order. Together, these trends suggested that world mineral re-
serves were meaningful, if provisionary, numerical descriptions linking 
knowledge of the earth to knowledge of modern societies and thus informing 
political and economic decision-making on a global scale. 
Against the background of autarkic ambitions and war economy, the 1930s 
and 1940s saw other forms of geopolitical calculations arising in the field of 
mineral resources. Not only was metal recycling advanced in the name of re-
source scarcity or improved resource efficiency. On an unprecedented scale, 
scientists and engineers also started to research and develop raw material sub-
stitutes and hence to set different – fuel and nonfuel – mineral resources against 
each other on the natural capital balance sheet. 
References 
Bain, Harry Foster. 1930. Mineral Resources and their Effect on International Rela-
tions. Journal of the Royal Institute of International Affairs 9 (5): 664-79. 
Bayerl, Günter. 1994. Prolegomenon der “Großen Industrie”. Der technisch-
ökonomische Blick auf die Natur im 18. Jahrhundert. In Umweltgeschichte. Um-
weltverträgliches Wirtschaften in historischer Perspektive, ed. Werner Abelshau-
ser, 29-56. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht. 
Beck, Richard. 1901. Lehre von den Erzlagerstätten. Berlin: Gebrüder Borntraeger. 
Blondel, Fernand, and Samuel Lasky. 1956. Mineral Reserves and Mineral Re-
sources. Economic Geology 51: 686-97. 
Bowden, Gary. 1985. The Social Construction of Validity in Estimates of US Crude 
Oil Reserves. Social Studies of Science 15 (2): 207-40. 
Brianta, Donata. 2000. Education and Training in the Mining Industry, 1760-1869: 
European Models and the Italian Case. Annals of Science 57 (3): 267-300. 
Brown, Jonathan C. 1993. Oil and Revolution in Mexico. Berkeley, Los Angeles 
and Oxford: University of California Press. 
Burt, Roger. 2000. Innovation or Imitation? Technological Dependency in the 
American Nonferrous Mining Industry. Technology and Culture 41: 321-47. 
De Launay, Louis. 1912. Les réserves mondiales en minerais de fer. Compte rendu 
de la 11e session du congrès géologique international, Stockholm 1910. Congres 
géologique international, 307-14. Stockholm: P. A. Norstedt & Söner. 
De Launay, Louis. 1918. France-Allemagne. Problemes Miniers, Munitions, Blo-
cus, Apres-guerre. Paris: Librairie Armand Colin. 
HSR 40 (2015) 2  │  168 
Doel, Ronald. 1989. Interview with Marion King Hubbert, Bethesda, MD, session 
IV, 17/01/1989 <http://www.aip.org/history/ohilist/5031_4.html> (Accessed Jan-
uary 14, 2014). 
Dörries, Matthias. 2005. Krakatau 1883: Die Welt als Labor und Erfahrungsraum. 
In Welt-Räume. Geschichte, Geographie und Globalisierung seit 1900, ed. Sabi-
ne Höhler and Iris Schröder, 51-73. Frankfurt a. M. and New York: Campus. 
Eckes, Alfred E. 1979. The United States and the Global Struggle for Minerals. 
Austin and London: University of Texas Press. 
Fabricant, Solomon. 1984. Toward a Firmer Basis of Economic Policy: The Found-
ing of the National Bureau of Economic Research <http://data.nber.org/ nberhis-
tory/sfabricantrev.pdf> (Accessed February 8, 2014). 
Frängsmyr, Tore, J. L. Heilbron, and Robin Rider, eds. 1990. The Quantifying Spirit 
in the Eighteenth Century. Berkeley, CA: California University Press. 
Friedensburg, Ferdinand. 1934. Kohle und Eisen im Weltkriege und in den Frie-
densschlüssen. München and Berlin: Oldenbourg. 
Friedensburg, Ferdinand. 1936. Die mineralischen Bodenschätze als weltpolitische 
und militärische Machtfaktoren. Stuttgart: Enke Verlag. 
Gautier, Donald L. 2000. Oil and Gas Resource Appraisal: Diminishing Reserves, 
Increasing Supply. In Prediction. Science, Decision Making, and the Future of 
Nature, ed. Daniel Sarewitz, Radford J. Byerly and Roger A. Pielke Jr., 231-50. 
Washington, DC: Island Press. 
Geistbeck, Michael. 1895. Der Weltverkehr. Freiburg i. Br.: Herder. 
Graf, Rüdiger. 2014. Expert Estimates of Oil-Reserves and the Transformation of 
“Petroknowledge” in the Western World from the 1950s to the 1970s. In Manag-
ing the Unknown. Essays on Environmental Ignorance, ed. Uwe Lübken and 
Frank Uekötter, 140-67. New York and Oxford: Berghahn. 
Greenblatt, Stephen. 1991. Marvelous Possessions: The Wonder of the New World. 
Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Guilhot, Nicolas. 2011. The Realist Gambit. Postwar American Political Science 
and the Birth of IR Theory. The Invention of International Relations Theory: Re-
alism, the Rockefeller Foundation, and the 1954 Conference on Theory, 128-61. 
New York: Columbia University Press. 
Haller, Lea, Sabine Höhler, and Andrea Westermann. 2014. Rechnen mit der Natur: 
Ökonomische Kalküle um Ressourcen. Einleitung. Berichte zur Wissen-
schaftsgeschichte 37 (1): 8-19. 
Harvey, Charles. 1981. The Rio Tinto Company, 1873-1954: An Economic History 
of a Leading International Mining Concern. Penzance: Alison Hodge. 
Hays, Samuel P. 1959. Conservation and the Gospel of Efficiency: The Progressive 
Conservation Movement, 1890-1920. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Heringman, Noah. 2004. Romantic Rocks, Aesthetic Geology. Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press. 
Hewett, Donnel Foster. 1929. Cycles in Metal Production. New York: The Ameri-
can Institute of Mining and Metallurgical Engineers (Technical Publication 183). 
Hirschman, Albert O. 1945. National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade. 
Berkeley: University of California Press (Publications of the Bureau of Business 
and Economic Research 5). 
Holland, Thomas. 1935. The Mineral Sanction as an Aid to International Security. 
Edinburgh and London: Oliver and Boyd. 
HSR 40 (2015) 2  │  169 
Hotelling, Harold. 1931. The Economics of Exhaustible Resources. Journal of 
Political Economy 39 (2): 137-75. 
Hovis, Logan W., and Jeremy Mouat. 1996. Miners, Engineers, and the Transfor-
mation of Work in the Western Mining Industry, 1880-1930. Technology and 
Culture 37: 429-56. 
Hubbert, Marion King. 1934. Future Ore Supply and Geophysical Prospecting. 
Engineering and Mining Journal 135 (1): 18-21. 
Hubbert, Marion King. 1943. Questioning of M. King Hubbert Before the Board of 
Economic Warfare (O.E.W.A), Washington, DC, 14 April 1943, 11-77 <http:// 
www.hubbertpeak.com/hubbert/technocracy1943.pdf> (Accessed January 14, 
2014). 
Hubbert, Marion King. 1975. Survey of World Energy Resources. In Symposium on 
Energy Sources for the Future: Oak Ridge, Tenn., July 7-25, 1975, ed. Jerome L. 
Duggan and Roger J. Cloutier, 1-30. Washington, DC: ERDA. 
Innis, Harold A. 1933. Problems of Staple Production in Canada. Toronto: The 
Ryerson Press. 
Isenberg, Andrew C. 2005. The Industrial Alchemy of Hydraulic Mining: Law, 
Technology, and Resource-Intensive Industrialization. In City, Country, Empire: 
Landscapes in Environmental History, ed. Jeffry M. Diefendorf and Kurk 
Dorsey, 122-37. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press. 
Kamen, Henry. 2002. Spain’s Road to Empire: The Making of a World Power, 
1492-1763. London: Allen Lane. 
Kapp, Karl W. 1941. The League of Nations and Raw Materials, 1919-1939. Gene-
va Studies 12 (3). Geneva: Geneva Research Centre. 
Krahmann, Max. 1903. Lagerstättenkunde und Bergwirtschaftslehre. Zeitschrift für 
praktische Geologie mit besonderer Berücksichtigung der Lagerstättenkunde und 
der davon abhängigen Bergwirtschaftslehre 11: 1-4. 
Krahmann, Max. 1928. Bergwirtschaftliche Arbeitsgemeinschaft. Eine Programm-
schrift. Berlin: Kurt Vowinckel Verlag. 
Krausmann, Fridolin, et al. 2009. Growth in Global Materials Use, GDP and Popu-
lation during the 20th Century. Ecological Economics 68 (10): 2696-705. 
Krige, John, and Kai-Henrik Barth. 2006. Global Power Knowledge. Science and 
Technology in International Affairs. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 
Krünitz, Johann Georg. 1773-1858. Oekonomisch-technologische Encyklopädie, 
oder allgemeines System der Staats- Stadt- Haus- und Landwirthschaft und der 
Kunstgeschichte, 242 vols. Berlin: Pauli. 
Laboulais, Isabelle. 2008. Serving Science and the State: Mining Science in France, 
1794-1810. Minerva 46: 17-36. 
Leith, Charles K. 1921. International Control of Minerals. Mineral Resources of the 
United States 1917, Part I: Metals (US G. Survey), 7a-16a. Washington, DC: US 
Government Printing Office. 
Leith, Charles K. 1927. Exploitation and World Progress. Foreign Affairs 6 (1): 
128-39. 
Leith, Charles K. 1970 [1931]. World Minerals and World Politics. A Factual Study 
of Minerals in Their Political and International Relations. Port Washington, NY: 
Kennikat Press. 
Leith, Charles K., et al. 1933. Elements of a National Mineral Policy. New York: 
American Institute of Mining and Metallurgy (AIME). 
HSR 40 (2015) 2  │  170 
Leith, Charles K., et al. 1943. World Minerals and World Peace. Washington, DC: 
The Brookings Institution. 
Lindenfeld, David F. 1997. The Practical Imagination. The German Sciences of 
State in the 19th Century. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 
Lingenfelter, Richard E., ed. 2003. The Mining West: A Bibliography and Guide to 
the History and Literature of Mining the American and Canadian West. Lanham, 
MD and London: Scarecrow Press. 
Lowood, Henry E. 1990. The Calculating Forester: Quantification, Cameral Sci-
ence, and the Emergence of Scientific Forestry Management in Germany. In The 
Quantifying Spirit in the 18th Century, ed. Tore Frängsmyr, J. L. Heilbron and 
Robin E. Rider, 315-42. Berkeley, CA: California University Press. 
McKelvey, Vincent E. 1972. Mineral Resource Estimates and Public Policy. Ameri-
can Scientist 60: 32-40. 
Merton, Richard. 1931. Die Versorgung der deutschen Wirtschaft mit Nicht-Eisen-
Metallen. Berlin: E. S. Mittler & Sohn. 
Mining and Metallurgical Society of America, ed. 1925. International Control of 
Minerals. Studies made by the Committee of the Mining and Metallurgical Socie-
ty of America on Foreign and Domestic Mining Policy and the Committee of the 
American Institute of Mining and Metallurgical Engineers on Industrial Prepar-
edness. New York: Mining and Metallurgical Society of America & American 
Institute of Mining and Metallurgical Engineers. 
Nasse, Rudolf. 1893. Die Kohlenvorräthe der europäischen Staaten, insbesondere 
Deutschlands, und deren Erschöpfung. Berlin: Puttkammer und Mühlbrecht. 
Nest, Michael. 2011. Coltan. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Ochs, Kathleen H. 1992. The Rise of American Mining Engineers: A Case Study of 
the Colorado School of Mines. Technology and Culture 33: 278-301. 
Osterhammel, Jürgen. 1987. Forschungsreise und Kolonialprogramm: Ferdinand 
von Richthofen und die Erschließung Chinas im 19. Jahrhundert. Archiv für Kul-
turgeschichte 69 (1): 150-95. 
Parrish, Wayne William. 1933. An Outline of Technocracy. New York: Farrar & 
Rinehart. 
Pehrson, Elmer W. 1946. The Mineral Position of the United States and Outlook for 
the Future. Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office. 
Pellis, Eduard. 1876. Le Simplon et la route des Indes. Bulletin de la Société vau-
doise des ingénieurs et des architectes 2 (1): 1-4. 
Porter, Ted. 1994. Making Things Quantitative. Science in Context 7 (3): 389-407. 
Prain, Ronald. 1975. Copper: The Anatomy of an Industry. London: Mining Journal 
Books. 
Pratt, Walden P., and Donald A. Brobst. 1974. Mineral Resources: Potentials and 
Problems. Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office (Geological Survey 
Circular 698). 
Priest, Tyler. 2000. Charles Kenneth Leith and the Quest for World Mineral Con-
trol, 1910-1930, unpublished Master thesis. Madison, WI: University of Madison 
Wisconsin. 
Priest, Tyler. 2003. Global Gambits: Big Steel and the U.S. Quest for Manganese. 
Westport, CT: Praeger. 
Priest, Tyler. 2014. Hubbert’s Peak: The Great Debate over the End of Oil. Histori-
cal Studies in the Natural Sciences 44 (1): 37-79.  
HSR 40 (2015) 2  │  171 
Pumpelly, Raphael. 1885. Report on the Mining Industries of the United States 
(Exclusive of the Precious Metals) with Special Investigations into the Iron Re-
sources of the Republic and into the Cretaceous Coals of the Northwest. 
Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office. 
Rathenau, Walther. 1925 [1916]. Deutsche Rohstoffversorgung. Vortrag, gehalten 
in der „Deutschen Gesellschaft 1914“ am 20. Dezember 1915. Rathenau, 
Walther: Wirtschaft, Staat und Gesellschaft. Gesammelte Schriften 5, 23-58. Ber-
lin: S. Fischer. 
Rawles, William P. 1933. The Nationality of Commercial Control of World Miner-
als. New York: American Institute of Mining and Metallurgical Engineers. 
Reuß, Christian Friedrich. 1777. Abhandlungen wie die Naturkunde der Grund zu 
einer wohleingerichteten Oekonomie, und wie groß der Einfluß derselben in die-
se Wissenschaft ist. Beschäftigung der Berlinischen Gesellschaft naturforschen-
der Freunde 3: 3-28. 
Roorbach, George B. 1912. Geography and Resources. Annals of the American 
Academy of Political and Social Science 39: 130-53. 
Rosenberg, Emily. 1999. Financial Missionaries to the World: The Politics and 
Culture of Dollar Diplomacy, 1900-1930. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press. 
Scott, James C. 1998. Seeing Like a State. How Certain Schemes to Improve Hu-
man Condition Have Failed. New Haven, CT, London: Yale University Press. 
Shulman, Peter A. 2005. Governing Nature, Nurturing Government: Resource 
Management and the Development of the American State, 1900-1912. Journal of 
Policy History 17 (4): 375-403. 
Sjögren, Hjalmar J. 1910. Summary of the Reports. In The Iron Ore Resources of 
the World. An Inquiry Made upon the Initiative of the Executive Committee of the 
International Geological Congress. Stockholm: Generalstabens Litografiska An-
stalt. 
Sjögren, Hjalmar J. 1912. Results of the Inquiry on Iron Ore Resources. In Compte 
rendu de la 11e session du congrès géologique international, Stockholm 1910. 
Congres géologique international, 297-301. Stockholm: P. A. Norstedt & Söner. 
Smith, George. O., ed. 1919. The Strategy of Minerals. A Study of the Mineral 
Factor in the World Position of America in War and Peace. Problems of War and 
of Reconstruction. New York and London: D. Appleton and Company. 
Smith, George O. 1921. The Economic Limits to Domestic Independence in Miner-
als. In Mineral Resources of the United States 1917, Part I: Metals (US G. Sur-
vey), 1a-6a. Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office. 
Spurr, Josiah Edward. 1919. The Shipping Crisis. In The Strategy of Minerals. A 
Study of the Mineral Factor in the World Position of America in War and in 
Peace, ed. George Otis Smith, 30-50. New York and London: D. Appleton. 
Spurr, Josiah Edward. 1920. Political and Commercial Geology and the World’s 
Mineral Resources. A Series of Studies by Specialists. New York: McGraw-Hill. 
The General Secretary of the Congress, ed. 1910. The Iron Ore Resources of the 
World. An Inquiry Made upon the Initiative of the Executive Committee of the XI 
International Geological Congress, Stockholm 1910 with the Assistance of Geo-
logical Surveys and Mining Geologists of Different Countries. Stockholm: Gene-
ralstabens Litografiska Anstalt. 
HSR 40 (2015) 2  │  172 
Thomas, Albert. 1927. International migration and its control. In Proceedings of the 
World Population Conference, ed. Margaret Sanger, 257-65. London: Edward 
Arnold & Co. 
Tooze, Adam. 2001. Statistics and the German State, 1900-1945. The Making of 
Modern Economic Knowledge. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Topik, Steven C., and Allan Wells. 2012. Warenketten in einer globalen Wirtschaft. 
In Geschichte der Welt, Bd. 5: Weltmärkte und Weltkriege, 1870-1945, ed. Emily 
S. Rosenberg, 589-814. München: C. H. Beck; Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univer-
sity Press. 
Trepp, Ann-Charlott. 2009. Von der Glückseligkeit alles zu wissen. Die Erfor-
schung der Natur als religiöse Praxis in der frühen Neuzeit. Frankfurt a. M. and 
New York: Campus. 
Tryon, Frederick Gale, and Frederick E. Berquist. 1932. Mineral Economics – An 
Outline of the Field. In Mineral Economics. Lectures under the Auspices of the 
Brookings Institution (A.I.M.E. series), ed. Frederick Gale Tryon, Edwin Eckel 
and Harry Foster Bain, 1-36. New York and London: McGraw Hill. 
United Nations, ed. 1950. Proceedings of the United Nations Scientific Conference 
on the Conservation and Utilization of Resources, 17 August-6 September, 1949, 
Lake Success, New York. Lake Success, NY: United Nations Department of Eco-
nomic Affairs. 
United States Geological Survey. 1921. World Atlas of Commercial Geology. 
Washington, DC: US Geological Survey. 
United States Civil Service Commission. 1943. Letter to Marion King Hubbert, 
Washington, DC, 14 August 1943, 7. <http://www.hubbertpeak.com/hubbert/ 
technocracy1943.pdf> (Accessed January 14, 2014). 
Veblen, Thorstein. 1965 [1921]. The Engineers and the Price System. New York: 
Augustus M. Kelley. 
von Carlowitz, Hans Carl. 1713. Sylvicultura Oeconomica, Oder Haußwirthliche 
Nachricht und Naturmäßige Anweisung Zur Wilden Baum-Zucht etc. Leipzig: 
Johann Friedrich Braun. 
von Linné, Carl. 1749. Oeconomia Naturae. Uppsala: Issak J. Biberg. 
Wellmer, Friedrich-Wilhelm, and Jens Dieter Becker-Platen. 1999. Mit der Erde 
leben. Beiträge Geologischer Dienste zur Daseinsvorsorge und nachhaltigen 
Entwicklung. Berlin and Heidelberg: Springer. 
Wellmer, Friederich-Wilhelm, Manfred Dalheimer, and Markus Wagner. 2007. 
Economic Evaluations in Exploration. Berlin: Springer. 
Werner, Abraham Gottlob. 1811. Relation über die aus sämtlichen bisherigen geognos-
tischen Untersuchungen im sächsischen Lande sich ergebenden Ergebnisse in Hin-
sicht auf das Vorkommen nützlicher, besonders brennbarer Fossilien und deren 
zweckmäßigste Nutzung. Bergarchiv Freiberg, Bestand 40003: Oberbergamt Frei-
berg, Geognostische Landesuntersuchung 35 <http://www.archiv.sachsen.de/cps/ 
bestaende.html?oid=01.05.05.01&file=40003.xml&syg_id=4435&obf2=31> (Ac-
cessed January 3, 2015). 
Westermann, Andrea. 2011. Disciplining the Earth: Earthquake Observation in 
Switzerland and Germany circa 1900. Environment and History 17 (1): 53-77. 
Westermann, Andrea. 2014. Inventuren der Erde. Vorratsschätzungen für minerali-
sche Rohstoffe und die Etablierung der Ressourcenökonomie. Berichte zur Wis-
senschaftsgeschichte 37 (1): 20-40. 
HSR 40 (2015) 2  │  173 
Worster, Donald. 1977. Nature’s Economy: The Roots of Ecology. San Francisco: 
Sierra Club Books. 
Yergin, Daniel. 1991. The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money, and Power. New 
York: Simon & Schuster. 
Zedler, Johann Heinrich. 1731-54. Grosses vollständiges Universallexicon aller Wis-
senschafften und Künste, 64+4 vols. Halle and Leipzig: Johann Heinrich Zedler. 
Zimmermann, Erich Walter. 1911. Die Britische Kohlenausfuhr, ihre Geschichte, 
Organisation und Bedeutung. Essen: W. Girardet. 
Zimmermann, Erich Walter. 1917. Foreign Trade and Shipping. Modern Business 
15. New York: Alexander Hamilton Institute. 
Zimmermann, Erich Walter. 1933. World Resources and Industries. A Functional 
Appraisal of the Availability of Agricultural and Industrial Resources. New 
York: Harper & Brothers. 
